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and inaccessible to the public because under copyright law, they are
considered to be orphan works: their owners cannot be identified or
located, and so permission to use the works cannot be obtained. While
orphan works have been most frequently discussed in the context of mass
digitization like the Google Books Project, they present problems beyond
book digitization and beyond American borders. Recent foreign efforts to
solve the orphan works issue have resulted in an EU Directive, which in
turn resulted in a U.K. Act to provide a licensing scheme for orphan works.
The U.S. must not fall behind in providing for an orphan works solution.
This Note argues that the U.S. should look to the U.K.’s Act as a
framework for enacting its own legislation. The U.K. is a suitable guide
because the two nations share an underlying economic rationale for their
copyright regimes. Moreover, the U.K. has more than one hundred years’
experience in adapting its copyright laws to achieve international
harmonization. By passing legislation that comports with international
principles, the U.S. can protect the interests of its creators and users abroad
and maintain an influential position in shaping global copyright policy.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2002, Google launched an endeavor with wide-reaching
ramifications: the Google Books Project.1 The project’s private efforts to
digitize the libraries of the world offered the possibility of searching
through hundreds of years of accumulated knowledge in just a few
keystrokes. At the same time, it highlighted a copyright concern inherent in
existing worldwide digitization efforts: the challenge of orphan works.
An orphan work is any copyrighted work whose owner or rights
holder2 “cannot be identified and located by someone who wishes to make
use of the work in a manner that requires permission of the copyright
owner.”3 The owner’s apparent absence presents a problem for any
1

The Google Books Project sought to scan millions of physical books, with both locatable and
unlocatable owners, to create a searchable, digital library. Google Books History, GOOGLE BOOKS,
http://www.google.com/googlebooks/history.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2014); see Pamela Samuelson,
Legislative Alternatives to the Google Book Settlement, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 697, 697 (2011).
“Mass digitization,” while “not a scientific term,” generally refers to the “large-scale scanning” of
books, as well as the scanning of historical documents by institutions, such as libraries and archives, in
an effort to preserve cultural heritage and to allow wider public access to the works. REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LEGAL ISSUES IN MASS DIGITIZATION: A PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION DOCUMENT 8–12 (2011) [hereinafter MASS DIGITIZATION REPORT],
available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/massdigitization/USCOMassDigitization_October2011.pdf.
2
Throughout this Note, I will refer to the owner or rights holder of a work simply as the “owner”
for ease of reference. This does not imply, however, that rights holders are excluded from my
discussion.
3
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 1 (2006),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf. This definition, while put forth by
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potential user of an orphan work because as long as the work’s ownership
remains uncertain, the user faces a potential risk that the owner will
resurface and bring a copyright infringement claim against the user.4 While
orphaned books posed a problem for Google, any copyrightable subject
matter can be orphaned, such as visual art, photography, musical works,
and sound recordings.5
Google was not alone in facing this difficulty. Several European
nations had begun to digitize their wealth of copyrightable works, which
they consider to be embodiments of their cultural heritage.6 The Google
Books Project presented a threat to those efforts,7 and as a result, the
European Union sought to resolve the orphan works issue.8 In October
2012, the EU passed a Directive that permitted some uses of orphan works,
including mass digitization by certain institutions, while still preserving
certain rights for potential resurfacing owners.9 The Directive requires each
Member State to implement its provisions through national legislation by
October 2014.10
Concurrent with the EU’s initiative,11 the United Kingdom embarked
on an effort to find its own solution, which became law on April 25, 2013.12
The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act established a copyright
licensing scheme, giving both individual and institutional users of orphan

the U.S. Copyright Office, is consistent with international definitions of orphan works. See, e.g., U.K.
INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, IMPACT ASSESSMENT: ORPHAN WORKS 1 (2012), available at
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/consult-ia-bis1063-20120702.pdf (“A copyrighted work is considered an orphan
when it is not possible to locate the right-holders after a diligent search.”).
4
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3.
5
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (listing the types of works that fall within copyright’s subject matter).
6
See Katharina de la Durantaye, Finding a Home for Orphans: Google Book Search and Orphan
Works Law in the United States and Europe, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 229, 275
(2011).
7
See id. at 275.
8
Note that although some countries have existing orphan works legislation, a comparison to those
countries’ laws is beyond the scope of this Note, because, as will be discussed, they do not share a
foundational copyright policy with the U.S.
9
Directive 2012/28/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on
Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, 2012 O.J. (L 299) 5.
10
See id. art. 9.
11
Though the U.K.’s Act did not pass until April 2013, the House of Commons introduced the
licensing provisions in an amended Bill in July 2012, before the passage of the EU Directive. Enterprise
and Regulatory Reform Bill, 2012, H.C. Bill [61] cl. 59 (U.K.). Moreover, the U.K.’s attention to the
orphan works issue dates at least back to 2006, when it was raised in an Intellectual Property Report.
See ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2006), available at http://
www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/other/0118404830/0118404830.pdf. The U.K.’s Intellectual
Property Office has indicated its desire to pass a national solution that, while compliant with the EU
Directive, is borne of the U.K.’s own domestic policies. See Dennis W.K. Khong, The (Abandoned)
Orphan-Works Provision of the Digital Economy Bill, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 560, 562 (2010).
12
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013, c. 24, § 77 (U.K.).
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works the ability to procure a license to use the work.13 The licenses will be
granted by a newly appointed regulatory body, in lieu of the absent owner,
provided that the user has fulfilled the stipulated requirements.14 Because
the Act implements the EU Directive, the U.K.’s new provisions ensure
that the orphan works solution is harmonized within the EU.15
By contrast, the United States has lagged behind in providing for use
of its orphaned works. Though Congress was aware of the need to remedy
the issue at least as early as 2005,16 due to interests of individual users and
creators, it has failed to pass any legislation to address the issue.17 As a
major exporter of creative material, the U.S. must engage with ongoing
international harmonization efforts in order to maintain its influential
position18 in shaping global copyright and to protect the interests of
American creators.
In October 2012, the U.S. Register of Copyrights issued a Notice of
Inquiry, calling for a new round of public comments from stakeholders
about the orphan works problem,19 thus renewing governmental efforts to
find a solution. The renewed call for comments comes in part as a response
to the EU Directive,20 and in part as a synthesis of the growing academic
discussion over orphan works and digitization in the U.S.21
Independent of the developing European solutions, the American
academic copyright community has increasingly drawn attention to the
orphan works issue, especially as a result of the mass digitization efforts.
Recent symposia at Columbia Law School22 and Berkeley Law School23
13

Id. § 77(3) (amending The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988) (inserting § 116(A)(1))
(“The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for the grant of licences in respect of works that
qualify as orphan works under the regulations.”).
14
Id. § 77(3) & sch. 22.
15
Harmonization is the general term for the process by which countries agree on cross-border
copyright laws. International copyright is governed by a patchwork of universal conventions and
neighboring treaties, of which the Berne Convention is the most important. For a full discussion of the
interplay among these treaties, see PAUL GOLDSTEIN & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 29–92 (3d ed. 2013).
16
See Preservation and Restoration of Orphan Works for Use in Scholarship and Education (PROUSE) Act of 2005, H.R. 24, 109th Cong. (2005).
17
See Notice of Inquiry, 77 Fed. Reg. 64,555, 64,556 & n.8 (Oct. 22, 2012).
18
See SILKE VON LEWINSKI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY 588 (2008) (“As
regards the trade approach, the USA became one of the driving forces and was in many respects the first
and only country to propose certain [copyright] provisions . . . [for] protection of computer programs
and those on rental rights.”).
19
See Notice of Inquiry, 77 Fed. Reg. at 64,560.
20
See id. at 64,555, 64,559.
21
See id. at 64,558.
22
Copyright Exceptions for Libraries in the Digital Age: Section 108 Reform, a symposium held at
Columbia Law School, Feb. 8, 2013, http://www.law.columbia.edu/kernochan/symposia/section-108reform.
23
April 2012 Orphan Works Symposium, a symposium held at Berkeley Law School, Apr. 12–13,
2012, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/orphanworks.htm. The articles detailing the ideas set forth in the
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brought together scholars and practitioners to discuss potential solutions.
Such solutions included expanding existing copyright exceptions for
institutional users, such as nonprofit libraries and archives;24 limiting
judicial remedies for resurfacing owners;25 passing legislation that would
help all users;26 and a combination of all three.27 Each proposal attempted to
balance the interests of owners and users within the U.S.
These proposals must not come at the expense of international
harmonization. Though this Note does not deny the relevance of these
perspectives, the international aspect is often ignored. As the modern
economy grows increasingly global and borders become invisible in the
face of content consumption, there is mounting urgency for harmonization
of disparate copyright principles.28 The U.S. must ensure that any solution
to the orphan works issue complies with international principles; otherwise,
it risks further complications when international harmonization is
inevitably forced upon the system.
As this Note went to press, the Southern District of New York held the
Google Books Project to be fair use.29 While this gives credence to fair use
solutions to orphan works at first glance, the orphan works issue still merits
congressional examination because fair use is an exception unique to
American copyright law and because orphan works present many problems
outside the mass digitization context.30 Reliance on fair use alone would
completely ignore the need for an internationally harmonized solution and
would not provide any certainty for nondigitization uses. Accordingly, the
U.S. must enact legislation to provide a complete orphan works solution.
This Note argues that the U.S. Congress and Copyright Office should
look to the U.K.’s licensing solution as guidance for its own orphan works
Symposium were published by the Berkeley Technology Law Journal. Symposium, Orphan Works &
Mass Digitization: Obstacles & Opportunities, 27 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1251 (2012).
24
See Jennifer M. Urban, How Fair Use Can Help Solve the Orphan Works Problem,
27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379, 1383 (2012).
25
See Ariel Katz, The Orphans, the Market, and the Copyright Dogma: A Modest Solution for a
Grand Problem, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1285, 1286–87 (2012).
26
See Randal C. Picker, Private Digital Libraries and Orphan Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1259, 1261–62 (2012).
27
See Stef van Gompel, The Orphan Works Chimera and How to Defeat It: A View from Across
the Atlantic, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1347, 1349–50 (2012).
28
See GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 15, at 10 (“The reasons for international protection
press ever more urgent as markets for cultural goods expand globally, and the media that disseminate
these literary and artistic works extend to all corners of the world.”).
29
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136(DC), 2013 WL 6017130 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
14, 2013). The Authors Guild has stated its intent to appeal the decision. See Jacob Gershman & Jeffrey
A. Trachtenberg, Google Wins Dismissal of Book-Scanning Suit, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/11/14/google-wins-dismissal-of-book-scanning-suit/.
30
It is also worth noting that the decision’s finding of fair use applies only to books at present.
Google, 2013 WL 6017130, at *1–2. However, that finding may likely be extended to other
copyrightable subject matter in future disputes.
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legislation. The “special relationship”31 between the U.S. and the U.K.
extends to the countries’ copyright regimes: both share a common
economic foundation, premised on utilitarian interests of the owner and
user.32 By contrast, the Continental European countries base their copyright
policies upon the moral rights of the author and creator.33 Merging
substantive domestic laws based on these opposing underlying principles
has raised many difficulties along the path to international harmonization.
The U.K. has engaged in international harmonization efforts for far longer
than the U.S.,34 and is therefore well positioned to guide the U.S. in
adapting its economically based copyright laws to conform to international
norms.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the common
economic principles underlying the American and British copyright
systems and traces their different approaches to international
harmonization. Part II introduces orphan works and the various issues they
present, from their first identification through their present controversy
within the mass digitization context. Part III discusses the past and current
approaches on the American, British, and European Union stages to solve
the orphan works issue. Finally, Part IV evaluates and compares the
approaches, arguing that while the U.S. should primarily adopt the system
advocated by the U.K., the U.K. system could equally benefit from ideas
inherent in the U.S. system.
I.

THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF U.S. AND U.K. COPYRIGHT LAW
U.S. federal copyright protection originates in the Constitution.35 The
Framers granted Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”36 This grant
of protection for “limited [t]imes” in exchange for an author’s contribution

31

See generally Ray Raymond, The U.S.–U.K. Special Relationship in Historical Context, in U.S.–
U.K. RELATIONS AT THE START OF THE 21ST CENTURY 1, 1 (Jeffrey D. McCausland & Douglas T.
Stuart eds., 2006).
32
VON LEWINSKI, supra note 18, at 38.
33
See id. at 50–54.
34
The U.K. began its international harmonization in 1886 when it signed the Berne Convention,
the primary international agreement governing copyright laws. Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221; WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15 (last visited Jan. 7,
2014). The U.S., however, did not join the Berne Convention until 1988—over one hundred years after
its fellow utilitarian counterpart. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568,
102 Stat. 2853. The Act entered into force in 1989. TREATY AFFAIRS STAFF, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
TREATIES IN FORCE 345 (2012), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202293.pdf.
35
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
36
Id.
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to public knowledge was drawn from the Framers’ experience with the
British copyright regime.37
Specifically, the British copyright policy was based on economic and
utilitarian rationales, dating back to Smith, Bentham, and Mill, and
confirmed by Locke’s labor theory: that the act of labor creates a right of
ownership in the laborer, allowing him to profit from his work.38 Applied to
copyright, Lockean doctrines promoted creativity and thus furthered public
access to such creation. Since the enactment of the Statute of Anne in
1710,39 the Crown protected authors’ rights to do with their works as they
pleased, but balanced those rights subject to the users’ interests, thereby
recognizing the public benefit in accessing the work.40
By contrast, most of Continental Europe subscribed to an author’s
rights, or droit d’auteur, system.41 Based on the Hegelian notion of natural
rights and personhood,42 an author’s rights system viewed a work as an
extension of the creator’s personality. The system thus accorded a different
set of rights to the creator and did not consider the users’ interests, as the
utilitarian systems did.43 France, for example, recognized author’s rights by
statute in the nineteenth century, and its system served as a model for many
other European laws.44
Author’s rights are reflected not only in specific provisions,45 but also
in the general terminology used throughout each code and in the code’s

37

Id.; see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 211 (2003) (“Renewals and extensions of patents and copyrights had
been common in England in the eighteenth century, . . . and it was English practice that provided the
model and inspiration for the copyright clause of the Constitution and for the early federal copyright
statutes.”).
38
See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 37, at 1; VON LEWINSKI, supra note 18, at 37.
39
8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
40
See VON LEWINSKI, supra note 18, at 37 (“The early English and American copyright laws
granted limited exclusive reproduction rights for authors, while highlighting the public benefit as a
rationale for protection: copyright was seen as an incentive to creation, leading to an enrichment of the
public.”).
41
See id. at 33.
42
Under Hegelian personhood or personality theory, the creator’s work becomes an extension of
his personhood, and thus becomes an inalienable right. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 37, at 63–
64; Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971–78 (1982).
43
See VON LEWINSKI, supra note 18, at 38. These moral rights include the rights of attribution (or
paternity), integrity, divulgation, and withdrawal. GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 15, at 358–
67. For a full discussion of the differences in rights and subsequent laws between the two systems, see
VON LEWINSKI, supra note 18, at 40–63.
44
See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 37, at 270.
45
See, e.g., CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C. PROP. INTELL.] art. L. 111-1(2) (Fr.);
Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] [UrhG] [Copyright Act],
Sept. 9, 1965, BFBL. I at 1273 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de.
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underlying policy statements.46 For example, the first article of the French
Intellectual Property Code states that “[t]he author of a work of the mind
shall enjoy in that work, by the mere fact of its creation, an exclusive
incorporeal property right which shall be enforceable against all persons.”47
Compared to the U.S.’s stated policy “to promote the [p]rogress of . . .
useful [a]rts,” which represents the public’s interest in using a work, the
Continental policy prioritizes the author’s interests in protecting her own
work.
A. Internationalization and Evolution of U.K. Copyright
Despite their common domestic copyright policies, the U.S. and the
U.K. approached international copyright harmonization on drastically
different timelines. The U.K. has gradually evolved from a strict utilitarian
system to one of compromise with Continental regimes through a series of
Copyright Acts passed in 1886, 1911, 1956, and 1988, whereas the U.S. did
not adjust to international norms until the second half of the twentieth
century.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, an international literary
congress in Paris sought to unify the then-existing system of bilateral
copyright treaties into one multilateral convention to protect author’s
rights.48 This ultimately led to the Berne Convention in 1886,49 which
brought together the world’s copyright leaders, including the U.K. Notably,
the U.S. sent a mere nonvoting observer and did not join the Convention.50
Berne members agreed, inter alia, to provide automatic protection to
any copyrightable work; that is, the work would be protected immediately
upon creation and would not hinge on any formalities of registration or

46

Author’s rights laws generally use words like “limitations” and “exceptions” to represent the
author’s view, whereas utilitarian systems generally use words like “fair use” and “acts permitted” to
represent the public’s view. See VON LEWINSKI, supra note 18, at 39.
47
C. PROP. INTELL. art. L. 111-1 (Fr.) (emphasis added).
48
MAKEEN FOUAD MAKEEN, COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY: THE SCOPE OF
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL, US, UK AND FRENCH LAW 23 (2000).
49
Id.
50
Lionel Bently & Brad Sherman, Great Britain and the Signing of the Berne Convention in 1886,
48 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 311, 312, 335 (2000). The voting countries were Belgium, France,
Germany, Haiti, Italy, Liberia, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, and the U.K. Id. at 312. The U.K., unsure
whether the U.S. would send a Berne representative, hesitated to send a delegate because it feared
harming its chance to forge a separate bilateral treaty with the U.S. Though the U.S. ultimately sent a
delegate, he acted only as an observer who did not carry the power to vote or to commit the U.S. to a
treaty. Nevertheless, the U.K. had already decided to attend and, as a result, was the only voting
representative from a utilitarian copyright regime. Id. at 325, 334–35.
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notice.51 In addition, the Convention declared that a work must be protected
at least for the life of the author plus fifty years.52
The U.K. Parliament enacted the International Copyright Act of 1886
to implement its Berne obligations.53 The Act included only nominal
considerations, however, and the U.K. was not truly forced to change its
copyright law substantively to comply with Berne until the Berlin Revision
of the Berne Convention in 1908.54 As a result, the U.K. passed the
Copyright Act of 1911,55 which enacted a number of statutory revisions,
including: the elimination of the formalities of registration and notice;56 the
origination of copyright protection at creation of the work, and not only at
its publication;57 the adoption of a new copyright duration of the author’s
life plus fifty years;58 the adoption of Berne’s subject matter provisions;59
and a broader definition of infringement to include the subject matter of
sound recording and film.60
After undergoing additional amendments in 1956,61 the U.K.’s current
copyright regime is governed by the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of
1988.62 The 1988 Act made “fresh provision[s]” regarding the rights of
creators in the U.K. and brought those rights in line with international
principles.63 Its compliance with international harmonization is evident in
providing for an entire chapter on moral rights,64 to meet the terms of the
Berne Convention’s Paris Act in 1971.65 Still, the Act reemphasizes its
utilitarian foundation by declaring that “[c]opyright is a property right.”66
The U.K. Intellectual Property Office neatly sums up its public access
51

Coree Thompson, Note, Orphan Works, U.S. Copyright Law, and International Treaties:
Reconciling Differences to Create a Brighter Future for Orphans Everywhere, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 787, 796 (2006).
52
Id. at 797.
53
49 & 50 Vict., c. 33 (U.K.).
54
Compare id., with Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46 (U.K.).
55
1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46 (U.K.).
56
See id. §§ 1(1), 36. See infra note 68 for a discussion of registration and notice formalities.
57
See id. § 1(1). This brought unpublished works under copyright protection.
58
Id. § 3.
59
This extended the subject matter of copyright to include “every original literary dramatic musical
and artistic work.” Id. § 1(1).
60
Id. §§ 1(2), 2.
61
Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 12 (U.K.) (adding special sound recording provisions
to comply with the Rome 1928 and Brussels 1948 Berne revisions regarding broadcasting and public
performance); see also MAKEEN, supra note 48, at 140–42 (detailing the exclusive rights provided by
the 1956 Act).
62
c. 48 (U.K.).
63
Id. pmbl.
64
Id. §§ 77–89.
65
See MAKEEN, supra note 48, at 142; see also VON LEWINSKI, supra note 18, at 132–37
(discussing rights required for implementation of the Berne Convention).
66
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 1 (U.K.).
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priorities by declaring that “[c]opyright rewards the making of, and
investment in, creative works while also recognising the need for use to be
made of those works.”67 As a culmination of the U.K.’s gradual
compromises in the twentieth century, the 1988 Act is an exemplary model
to show the U.S. how to incorporate author’s rights ideas into an existing
utilitarian system.
B. Defiant Internationalization of U.S. Copyright
Across the Atlantic, the U.S. took more than a hundred years to join
the Berne Convention. For one reason, Berne’s strict requirements,
especially its prohibition of formalities,68 were deemed too much in conflict
with existing U.S. copyright law at the time of Berne’s passing.69 For
another reason, in 1886, U.S. imports of foreign works greatly
outnumbered the exports of American-made material.70 By not joining
Berne and thus denying additional protection to imported works, the U.S.
was able to consume more content, and so it was momentarily content to
remain isolated from the world of international copyright.71
This moment of contentment would not last long. After the enactment
of the 1909 Copyright Act, motion pictures began to proliferate within the
U.S., and as audiovisual embodiments of American culture, they quickly
became a major U.S. export.72 This explosion of American cultural exports
was not limited to films alone: American books, magazines, and other
published works became so popular internationally that “[b]y 1954, the
United States was the greatest exporter of printed material.”73 Still
67

INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, COPYRIGHT: ESSENTIAL READING 2 (2011), available at
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/c-essential.pdf.
68
Copyright formalities include the requirements of publication, notice, deposit, and registration.
First, the 1790 and 1802 U.S. Copyright Acts required a work to be published in order to be protected
by copyright. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124; Copyright Act of 1802, 2 Stat. 171. This publication
requirement was eliminated in favor of a “fixation” requirement by the 1976 Copyright Act. Now, a
work need only be “fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression,” thereby allowing unpublished works to
be protected by copyright. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2544
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012)). Second, public notice of the work in a newspaper was required
by the 1790 and 1802 Acts. 1 Stat. 124; 2 Stat. 171. By the 1976 Act, only “reasonable notice” was
required, 90 Stat. 2541, and by the 1988 Act, notice became optional, Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.). Third, in 1790 and 1802, a work needed to be deposited with a district court
clerk and the Secretary of State. 1 Stat. 124; 2 Stat. 171. By 1909, it merely needed to be deposited with
the Copyright Office; this requirement is still in force. Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075; 17 U.S.C.
§ 407 (2012). Lastly, the early Acts required a work to be registered with the clerk. 1 Stat. 124; 2 Stat.
171. The 1909 Act required registration only before bringing a lawsuit for infringement. 35 Stat. 1075.
69
Thompson, supra note 51, at 797.
70
See id.
71
For a full discussion of the U.S.’s role in Berne compliance, see id. at 792–800.
72
Id. at 797.
73
Id.
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Congress did not choose to overhaul its copyright regulations to comply
with Berne; after all, American authors could gain unofficial access to
Berne protections through simultaneous publication of their works in
Canada, which was a Berne member.74
Though it did not enact full Berne compliance measures, Congress
took an intermediate step in 1952 by joining the Universal Copyright
Convention (UCC) to provide a “more adequate basis” to protect American
works abroad.75 This allowed the U.S. to play a greater role in international
copyright policy while still abstaining from the Berne Convention.
However, as U.S. membership in the UCC increasingly became an
insignificant concession to the international copyright community, and as
Berne members grew upset with the American “ruse” of gaining Berne
protection through Canadian publication, international pressure mounted on
the U.S. and led to the Copyright Act of 1976.76 The 1976 Act’s elimination
of some formalities77 paved the way for the U.S. finally to join the Berne
Convention in 1988.78
The U.S. joined the Berne Convention for two primary purposes. First,
piracy of U.S. works had become a significant concern by 1988. Inadequate
protection abroad resulted in approximately $50 billion in losses for the
U.S. intellectual property industries in 1986 alone.79 At a time when the
U.S. operated on an overall trade deficit, boosting income from foreign use
of copyrighted American works was seen as a worthwhile effort to reduce
the trade deficit.80 Second, the U.S. wanted to take a greater role in shaping
and managing international copyright policy.81 Joining Berne offered
copyright relations with twenty-four countries outside the UCC, as well as
potential relations with China, a major importer of—and thus a piracy
threat to—U.S. works.82 By joining the Berne Convention, the U.S. took a
74

Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 83-2608, at 2 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3629, 3630; see TREATY
AFFAIRS STAFF, supra note 34, at 344 (noting that the UCC was signed on September 6, 1952, and
entered into force on September 16, 1955).
76
Thompson, supra note 51, at 797–98 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 83-2608, at 4).
77
See supra note 68.
78
Because the Berne Convention is not a self-executing treaty, the U.S. passed the Berne
Convention Implementation Act in 1988. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
79
S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3707 (“The U.S.
International Trade Commission estimated recently that U.S. companies lost between $43 billion and
$61 billion during 1986 because of inadequate legal protection for United States intellectual property,
including copyrights.”).
80
See id.
81
Id. at 2. The U.S. wanted to influence international copyright for many reasons, one of which
was to secure international recognition for phonograms. See VON LEWINSKI, supra note 18, at 33–34,
430 & n.12.
82
S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 3 (“First, adherence to Berne will immediately give the United States
copyright relations with 24 countries with which no current relations exist. A twenty-fifth country, the
75
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seat at the head table and extended the breadth of its protection to stem the
effects of piracy.
Since 1988, U.S. copyright law has been amended four times to
respond to technological changes and to comply with international
harmonization principles.83 To stay relevant and to maintain a strong
policy-shaping position, the U.S. should join the international copyright
community as it tackles the next big hurdle: orphan works.
II. ORPHAN WORKS AND THE PROBLEMS THEY PRESENT
The international copyright community is now wrestling with the
orphan works issue. Untraceable copyright owners cause a significant
amount of works to be deemed “orphaned.” For example, the British
Library estimates that forty percent of the works in its repository under
copyright are orphan works,84 and copyright experts85 estimate such works
to number in the millions. This causes problems for prospective individual
users who cannot confidently use such works without fear of liability, and
thus the works remain unused and unnoticed. The situation becomes
increasingly urgent as many museums, archives, and other nonprofit
institutions seek to digitize their collections. Not only would the institutions
benefit from permission to digitize the orphan works, but also the
subsequent digitization of such works would make them available on an

Peoples Republic of China, with more than a billion potential users of American works, has given
strong signals that it is considering adherence to Berne.”).
83
See Thompson, supra note 51, at 803. In 1990, Congress granted a limited set of moral rights to
visual artists, including the right of attribution and integrity and the right to prevent intentional
distortion or destruction of the work, in the Visual Artists Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 603(a),
104 Stat. 5089, 5128–33 (1990). In 1994, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act added section 104A to
the Copyright Act, which restored copyrights in foreign works that had fallen into the public domain.
Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976–81 (1994). In 1998, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act extended the duration of copyright protection to the life of the author plus seventy years,
or ninety-five years from the date of creation if a work for hire. Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat.
2827, 2827–28 (1998). Again in 1998, Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which
created a wide swath of anti-circumvention provisions for technological works and carved out safe
harbor exceptions for certain users. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
84
Amanda N. Wilson, Comment, Jet-Setting Orphan Works: The Transnational Making Available
of Works of Unknown Authorship, Anonymous Works, or Lost Authors, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 783,
784 (2009).
85
See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 905 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“There are millions of
such works. For example, according to European Union figures, there are 13 million orphan books in
the European Union (13% of the total number of books in-copyright there), 225,000 orphan films in
European film archives, and 17 million orphan photographs in United Kingdom museums.”); see also
Pamela Samuelson, Op-Ed., Digitizing Knowledge, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2012, at A11 (“Even if the
money wasn’t a problem, hundreds of thousands—and probably millions—of books are likely to be
‘orphan works’ whose rights-holders are unknown or can’t be found.”). Note too that Professor
Samuelson refers only to books; orphaned paintings, photographs, recordings, and other types of
cultural material would likely increase this figure enormously.
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unprecedented scale.86 Accordingly, this Part will introduce the basic
orphan works problem, the dramatic increase in orphan works as a result of
international harmonization, and finally, recent litigation concerning mass
digitization and orphan works.
A. The Creation and Evolution of the Orphan Works Issue
An artist or institution that wants to use an orphan work faces legal
uncertainty and an increased liability risk because the prospective user
cannot contact the owner to obtain consent.87 The user cannot determine
“whether or under what conditions the owner would permit use.”88 This
creates a liability risk that, while seemingly remote, many users are
unwilling to take for fear that the owner might appear and sue for
infringement after use of the work has begun.89 For a large scale example, a
film studio whose screenplay is based on an orphaned novel might risk
being forced to shut down film production if the novel’s author resurfaced
before the film’s release. On a smaller scale, an individual composer of
choral works might risk an infringement suit for using an orphaned volume
of poetry in his musical settings if the poet’s previously unlocatable heirs
came forward after publication and performance of the works.90
Moreover, mass digitization projects91 raise similarly unfortunate
situations. The National Jazz Museum in Harlem, for example, may
encounter difficulties with digitizing many of its recordings, including
previously unheard recordings by Coleman Hawkins, Billie Holiday, and
Lester Young, because tracking down their true owners is a costly and
time-intensive effort.92 As another example, Cornell University’s library
has more than 850,000 pages of literature detailing the development of
American agriculture, of which 198 monographs cannot be digitized

86

Solving this issue would allow the U.S. to take its role as the world’s primary cultural exporter
even further, by providing digital access to undeveloped countries and vastly improving research
capabilities. See Samuelson, supra note 85 (“Digital libraries containing millions of out-of-print and
public domain works would vastly expand the scope of research and education worldwide, extending
access to millions of people in undeveloped countries who don’t have it now. It would also open up
amazing opportunities for discovery of new knowledge. Being able to conduct searches over a corpus of
millions of books allows researchers to learn things never before possible.”).
87
See, e.g., REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 15.
90
E-mail from Francis Lynch, Chicago composer, to author (May 15, 2013) (on file with the
Northwestern University Law Review).
91
See infra Part II.C for a more detailed discussion of digitization issues.
92
Larry Rohter, Great Jazz, Long Unheard, Is Rediscovered, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2010, at C1.
Note that finding the owner of a musical work is often not as straightforward as knowing the performer.
Under any number of contractual agreements, the owner of a sound recording or musical work could be
the artist, the producer, the record company, or even an uninterested third party. See id.
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because the copyright owners cannot be located, even after the library spent
over $50,000 on the search.93
To alleviate these concerns, the U.S. Copyright Office sought to
facilitate the digitization of orphan works in two recent efforts. First, the
Copyright Office made mass digitization—of all works, not only orphan
works—a top priority in its two-year plan, released in October 2011,94
which resulted in its Report on Mass Digitization later that year.95 The
Report addressed “the relationship between the emerging digital
marketplace and the existing copyright framework” by undertaking “an
intense public discussion about the broader policy implications of mass
book digitization.”96
Second, the Copyright Office’s 2012 Notice of Inquiry specifically
asked for commentary on orphan works within the mass digitization
context.97 In addition to digitizing the materials, the Copyright Office also
prioritized improving the “nature, accuracy, and searchability” of its
historic copyright records, noting that public–private partnerships could be
useful in digitizing these records.98
Unidentifiable and unlocatable owners undoubtedly present a problem
for individual and institutional users, yet this creates an even larger
uncertainty that frustrates the goals of an economically based copyright
policy in two key ways identified by the U.S. Copyright Office.99 First,
copyright’s economic incentive is undermined. Owners cannot be
compensated for their labor if they cannot be located. Users are forced to
be inefficient by substituting a different work for the orphaned work that
might have better suited their needs.100 Second, the public is inevitably

93

See Benjamin T. Hickman, Note, Can You Find a Home for This “Orphan” Copyright Work? A
Statutory Solution for Copyright-Protected Works Whose Owners Cannot Be Located, 57 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 123, 124–25 (2006).
94
See MARIA A. PALLANTE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, PRIORITIES AND SPECIAL PROJECTS OF THE
UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE: OCTOBER 2011–OCTOBER 2013, at 5, 15 (2011), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/priorities.pdf.
95
MASS DIGITIZATION REPORT, supra note 1.
96
Id. at ii.
97
Notice of Inquiry, 77 Fed. Reg. 64,555, 64,561 (Oct. 22, 2012) (The notice asked: “[h]ow should
mass digitization be defined, what are the goals and what, therefore, is an appropriate legal framework
that is fair to authors and copyright owners as well as good faith users? What other possible solutions
for mass digitization projects should be considered?”).
98
Id. at 64,558. SoundExchange is an example of one successful public–private partnership, in that
Congress created a new statutory right (a performance right for sound recordings) and the Library of
Congress’s Copyright Royalty Board gave SoundExchange, a private nonprofit organization, the right
to collect and distribute the royalties generated from the right. Of course, in SoundExchange’s case, the
owners of the works are (or at least should be) readily identifiable, unlike the potential case in the
orphan works situation. SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com (last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
99
Notice of Inquiry, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739, 3741 (Jan. 26, 2005).
100
See id.
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harmed because it is deprived of access to the orphan work.101 The liability
risk faced by users “may unduly restrict access to millions of works that
might otherwise be available to the public (e.g., for use in research,
education, mainstream books, or documentary films).”102 The public could
make significant use of these orphan works to preserve cultural history,
create new expression, and increase access for education, science, and the
useful arts.103
Although current U.S. copyright law does not explicitly address these
concerns, it does contain some provisions that, while ultimately
insufficient, the user can rely on in order to use an orphan work.104
Additionally, a number of alternatives are available for a user who chooses
to proceed with her planned use of the work without searching for the
owner. She may be able to use the work in a noninfringing way, to claim
fair use,105 or to use a substitute work.106 For example, the National Jazz
Museum is able to use noninfringing snippets of the orphaned sound
recordings to attract visitors to its collection because using a small portion
of the recording qualifies as fair use.107 Cornell’s library has digitized the
remaining documents in the agriculture collection, notwithstanding the
orphaned monographs.108 The choral composer may be able to claim fair
101

Id.
Notice of Inquiry, 77 Fed. Reg. at 64,555.
103
See Thompson, supra note 51, at 788.
104
Section 108(h) allows libraries and archives to “reproduce, distribute, display, or perform”
published works within the last twenty years of their copyright term under certain conditions. 17 U.S.C.
§ 108(h)(1) (2012). This relies on a reasonableness requirement for enforcement, but this
reasonableness has not been interpreted to date by any courts. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3,
at 46. Section 115 creates a compulsory license for sound recordings. § 115; see also REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3, at 47. Section 504(c)(2) provides a limitation on damages in certain
circumstances. § 504(c)(2); see also REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3, at 49. The statute of
limitations provided in section 507(b) makes damages unavailable against the user of an orphan work
three years after the infringement claim accrued. § 507(b); see also REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra
note 3, at 70. The termination provisions—sections 203 and 304(c)–(d)—in the Copyright Act establish
default rules for resolving where the termination notice may be served in the event that an owner cannot
be located. §§ 203, 304(c)–(d). These provisions also rely on a reasonableness standard. REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3, at 50–52.
105
See § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies
or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright.”). Fair use is used frequently and successfully as a
defense to a copyright infringement claim. See Urban, supra note 24, at 1389–92. The fair use analysis
involves evaluating four factors: (1) the “purpose and character of the use” (e.g., whether the work is
commercial or noncommercial); (2) “the nature of the copyrighted work”; (3) the “amount and
substantiality” of the copyrighted work used; and (4) the market harm of the use. § 107(1)–(4).
106
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3, at 52.
107
See Editorial, Free That Tenor Sax, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, at WK7; Steven Seidenberg,
Orphaned Treasures: A Trove of Historic Jazz Recordings Has Found a Home in Harlem, but You
Can’t Hear Them, A.B.A. J., May 2011, at 47, 48.
108
See Hickman, supra note 93, at 124.
102
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use if his works are performed only with nonprofit organizations, or he may
use different poems. While these solutions may be slightly helpful, they are
ultimately short-term, incomplete, and inefficient. Moreover, they deprive
the public of access to the orphaned work, and increasing access should be
the ultimate goal of any U.S. orphan works regulation.109
B. How International Harmonization Created More Orphan Works
While existing U.S. copyright provisions110 create alternative avenues
for a user, the copyright provisions added in 1976 and 1988 to implement
international norms actually exacerbated the orphan works problem in two
ways. First, the elimination of the registration111 and notice112 formalities, as
required by the Berne Convention, made the search for a work’s owner
more difficult.113 Registration made the U.S. Copyright Office aware of the
name of the owner and that he wished the work to be protected by
copyright. Notice, by contrast, provided the public with the name of the
owner and the first year of copyright protection, which enabled a user to
determine when the copyright might expire.114 While the formalities
process was not inherently difficult—submitting some paperwork and
paying a fee—it served as a “trap for the unwary” and resulted in the loss
of some copyrights by owners who were unaware of the process.115
When amending the 1976 Act to eliminate the publication
requirement, Congress decided that the benefits of the new system, which
provided copyright protection immediately upon a work’s fixation in a
tangible form, outweighed the harms created by a potentially larger orphan
works problem.116 Congress opted instead to protect copyrights of those
owners who were unaware of the formalities requirements, at the expense
of complicating the search for an orphaned owner.
109

Letter from Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator, & Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senator, to Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights (Jan. 5, 2010), in REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3 (emphasizing lack of
public access as one of the major problems with orphan works: “[the inability of a potential user to
obtain permission to use an orphan work is] unfortunate and inconsistent with the purpose of the
Copyright Act, because in such cases it would seem that although no one objects to the use, the public
nevertheless is deprived of access to that work”).
110
See supra note 104.
111
The registration formality was removed by the 1909 Copyright Act. See supra note 68.
112
The notice formality became optional in the 1988 Act. See supra note 68.
113
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3, at 3–4. Eliminating formalities of registration and
notice hindered the search process because the Copyright Office no longer had a registration application
to locate every rights holder, and the protected work no longer was required to note the owner of the
work and the first year of copyright protection.
114
See id.; supra note 68.
115
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3, at 43 (“[T]here was substantial evidence presented
during consideration of the 1976 Act that the formalities such as renewal and notice, when combined
with drastic penalties like forfeiture of copyright, served as a ‘trap for the unwary’ and caused the loss
of many valuable copyrights.”).
116
Id.
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Moreover, many congressional representatives thought that the orphan
works issue would be limited in scope and therefore was unworthy of their
concern. They anticipated that scholarly institutions, which could protect
themselves using the fair use exception,117 would be most affected:
It is true that today’s ephemera represent tomorrow’s social history, and
that works of scholarly value . . . would be protected much longer under the
bill. Balanced against this are the burdens and expenses of [formalities] . . . .
Moreover, it is important to realize that the bill would not restrain scholars
from using any work as source material or from making “fair use” of it . . . .
The advantages of a basic term of copyright . . . outweigh any possible
disadvantages.118

Even though this elimination of formalities contributed to the
proliferation of orphaned works, the Register of Copyrights stated “[t]o be
clear, Congress amended the law for sound reasons,” including stronger
copyright protection for U.S. works abroad.119
The second way in which international harmonization exacerbated the
orphan works issue was through the extended copyright term. The
extension of a copyright’s duration from life-plus-fifty to life-plus-seventy
years made it more difficult for a prospective user to discern whether a
work was still protected under copyright.120 The additional twenty years
created an even larger vacuum in which a creator’s heir (and thus the
work’s owner) could disappear; moreover, some scholars question whether
the additional term added any value to the copyright at all.121 Although the
U.S. Copyright Office was aware of the exacerbation of the orphan works
issue when Congress enacted the Copyright Term Extension Act in 1998,122
Congress again determined that the benefits of international harmonization
outweighed the inevitable confusion over whether a work remained under
copyright. As the law stands, “a user generally must assume that a work he
wishes to use is subject to copyright protection, and often cannot confirm
whether a work has fallen into the public domain.”123
117

See Urban, supra note 24, at 1389–91 (describing the flexibility of fair use and its application to
a variety of situations).
118
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 136 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5752.
119
Notice of Inquiry, 77 Fed. Reg. 64,555, 64,556 (Oct. 22, 2012).
120
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827
(1998); Notice of Inquiry, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739, 3740 (Jan. 26, 2005); REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra
note 3, at 3.
121
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 471, 473–74 (2003) (footnotes omitted) (“[F]ewer than 11 percent of the copyrights registered
between 1883 and 1964 were renewed at the end of their twenty-eight-year term, even though the cost
of renewal was small. And only a tiny fraction of the books ever published are still in print; for
example, of 10,027 books published in the United States in 1930, only 174, or 1.7 percent, were still in
print in 2001. These data suggest that most copyrights depreciate rapidly . . . .”).
122
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3, at 32.
123
Id. at 3–4.
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C. Litigation Efforts and the Inevitability of Legislation
Two recent U.S. cases have addressed the issue of orphan works and
mass digitization. However, neither case provided a complete solution, and
together, both have proven that the orphan works issue must ultimately be
addressed through legislation.
First, the Google Books Project sought to create “a future world in
which vast collections of books are digitized,” which, in the short term,
meant that Google embarked on a worldwide effort to scan millions of
physical books.124 This brought on a flurry of concerns, both domestic and
international. Some in the EU called the project a “disgrace” to European
cultural identity, and even went so far as to call Google’s Project “cultural
rape.”125 Several U.S. publishers, representing their authors, and the
Author’s Guild, representing the interests of orphan work owners, brought
suit against Google.
Google and the defendants proposed a settlement that would allow
Google to move ahead with its Project; in return, Google would pay $125
million, including legal fees, to resolve the authors’ existing claims and to
establish a Book Rights Registry to aid in locating the owners of orphaned
books.126 The settlement was rejected by the Southern District of New York
in March 2011 on grounds that it would be both over- and
underinclusive.127 The settlement “would inappropriately implement a
forward-looking business arrangement granting Google significant rights to
exploit entire books without permission from copyright owners, while at
the same time releasing claims well beyond those presented in the
dispute.”128 In its decision, the court stated that sorting out orphan works
issues “are matters more appropriately decided by Congress than through
an agreement among private, self-interested parties.”129 Google eventually
settled privately with the publishers, but not with the Author’s Guild; thus,
the settlement did not provide any private solutions for the orphan works
issue.130
Second, the HathiTrust Digital Library was formed to pool the
resources of some of the nonprofit libraries that had previously partnered
124

Google Books History, supra note 1; see also Samuelson, supra note 1 (“[Under the Google
Book Search initiative], Google has scanned millions of in-copyright books . . . .”).
125
See de la Durantaye, supra note 6.
126
Press Release, Google, Authors, Publishers, and Google Reach Landmark Settlement (Oct. 28,
2008), available at http://googlepress.blogspot.com/2008/10/authors-publishers-and-google-reach_28.
html.
127
See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The initial
proposed settlement was revised twice in response to “hundreds of objections,” and in this decision, the
court rejected what was referred to as the “Amended Settlement Agreement,” the third iteration of the
proposed settlement. Id. at 669, 671.
128
Notice of Inquiry, 77 Fed. Reg. 64,555, 64,557 (Oct. 22, 2012).
129
Google, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 677.
130
Notice of Inquiry, 77 Fed. Reg. at 64,557.
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with Google.131 HathiTrust created an online digital repository of books,
with a subproject to digitize orphan works.132 On October 10, 2012, the
Southern District of New York held that HathiTrust’s overall activities
were protected by fair use.133 It did not, however, rule on the orphan works
issue for lack of ripeness, because HathiTrust had since suspended its
Orphan Works Project.134 HathiTrust won the remaining issues in the case
by arguing that all four fair use factors135 went in its favor.
While the court agreed with the fair use defense, this case still
highlighted the urgent need for orphan works legislation. Because fair use
is only a defense and not a codified orphan works exemption, future
potential individual users cannot rely on fair use alone to protect their use
of the works, especially if the use is outside the digitization context.
Moreover, relying on fair use alone would stifle any attempt at an
internationally harmonized orphan works solution, because fair use is a
construct unique to U.S. copyright law, without worldwide parallels.136 The
Google Books Settlement and the HathiTrust case are recent examples of
why a legislative solution to the orphan works issue presses ever more
urgent.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR THE ORPHAN WORKS ISSUE
Both the U.S. and the U.K. have proposed various measures to solve
the orphan works issue. Though the U.S.’s initial efforts stalled, its
Copyright Office should incorporate international considerations as it
undertakes a new initiative, so that the solution does not present further
complications resulting from later harmonization attempts. To that end,
close examination of the U.K.’s recently enacted solution will be a key
guide to pave the way for an internationally harmonized U.S. solution. This
Part will discuss the past and present efforts the U.S. and the U.K. have
taken to address the orphan works issue.
A. U.S. Efforts
The U.S. must resolve the orphan works dilemma through legislation
and not through the judiciary. Supreme Court precedent recognized that it

131

See Samuelson, supra note 1, at 726.
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 448–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
133
Id. at 464.
134
Id. at 455–56, 465.
135
Id. at 458–64; see supra note 105 for articulation of the four fair use factors.
136
See VON LEWINSKI, supra note 18, at 36. Note that the U.K. and Canada have fair use
corollaries, the doctrine of “fair dealing,” but they are more limited in scope than U.S. fair use. See
MAKEEN, supra note 48, at 156–64; VON LEWINSKI, supra note 18, at 36.
132
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is “Congress’s responsibility to adapt the copyright laws in response to
changes in technology.”137
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s confirmation of the Copyright
Term Extension Act in Eldred v. Ashcroft,138 Congress recognized the
increasing urgency of the orphan works problem as a result of the longer
copyright term. In separate letters to the Copyright Office, members of the
Senate and House Subcommittees on Intellectual Property requested that
the Office investigate the orphan works problem and report to Congress.
They requested that the report address issues of international
harmonization,139 the creation of databases,140 and preservation of works by
cultural institutions.141
1. The 2006 Report on Orphan Works.—Following this
Congressional request, the Copyright Office solicited comments on the
orphan works problem from the public, calling on stakeholders such as
professors, interest groups, and associations representing the core copyright
137

Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430–31 (1984)); see also Sony Corp. of Am., 464
U.S. at 430–31 (footnotes omitted) (“From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in
response to significant changes in technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying
equipment—the printing press—that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection. Repeatedly,
as new developments have occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned the new
rules that new technology made necessary.”).
138
537 U.S. 186 (2003). Lead Petitioner Eric Eldred ran a website that digitized works upon the
expiration of their copyright term and their entrance into the public domain. When the 1998 Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) added twenty years to the term of all works under
copyright, Eldred’s website could not add new works until 2017, when the next works fell into the
public domain. Complaint at ¶¶ 16, 24–25, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 01618), 1999 WL 33743484. Eldred, along with a number of commercial and noncommercial parties who
relied on works in the public domain, claimed that the CTEA was unconstitutional for two reasons:
first, it violated the “limited times” requirement, and second, it violated petitioners’ First Amendment
rights. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, rejected both arguments and
held that the CTEA was constitutional. Id. at 194. Many copyright academics saw this as the beginning
of a slippery slope that could lead to a perpetual copyright term. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note
121, at 471–75 (exploring the economics of a hypothetical perpetual copyright in light of multiple
congressional efforts to extend copyright duration, up to and including the CTEA).
139
Letter from Lamar Smith, Member of Cong., to Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights (Jan. 7,
2005), in REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3 (“[O]ther countries have created mechanisms to
address both the commercialization of works with unlocatable copyright owners and the accessibility
issue.”).
140
Letter from Howard L. Berman, Member of Cong., to Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights
(Jan. 10, 2005), in REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3 (advocating the creation of an “accurate,
updated, and electronically searchable database of copyright ownership”).
141
See Preservation and Restoration of Orphan Works for Use in Scholarship and Education (PROUSE) Act of 2005, H.R. 24, 109th Cong. 1, 1–2 (2005) (a bill that would have exempted “the
preservation and restoration of copyrighted works for research, scholarly, and educational purposes”
from infringement claims); Letter from Howard L. Berman to Marybeth Peters, supra note 140
(referencing his support for H.R. 24 but recognizing that the Bill “constitute[d] only a partial solution”
to the orphan works problem, and thus encouraging further exploration of solutions to the issue).
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industries.142 After receiving over 850 comments, the Report on Orphan
Works proposed specific legislation to “provide a meaningful solution” to
the problem.143 The Report is noteworthy because it was the first
comprehensive look at the orphan works issue by the U.S. government and
accordingly set the framework for American policy, however tentative, on
the subject.
The Report stated that any U.S. orphan works legislation should fulfill
the following primary goals:
1. Locate the owner,144 subject to (A) a reasonably diligent
search and (B) attribution.145
2. Provide for situations where the owner cannot be found. If the
owner cannot be located, the system must balance the user’s
reliance interests with the owner’s original interests.146
3. Promote efficiency by minimizing transaction costs of
stakeholders, including owners, users, and the federal
government.147
Consistent with these goals, instead of a blanket exemption for orphan
works use, the Report proposed148 to limit the remedies provision of the
Copyright Act for orphan works, contingent on a given set of
circumstances.149 The legislation would have two primary sections: first, the
“threshold requirements of a reasonably diligent search” for the owner and

142

These groups include, inter alia, the Association of American Publishers, The Authors Guild,
Library of Congress, Stanford University Libraries, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Smithsonian
Institution, The Harry Fox Agency, Recording Industry Association of America, American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers, Motion Picture Association of America, Electronic Frontier
Foundation, and Google. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3, at 17–18.
143
Id. at 7, 17. The Report also considered various nonlegislative solutions suggested by
commenters, but they were ultimately deemed to be insufficient. See id. at 5, 69. As discussed in
Part IV, these alternative solutions are ultimately incomplete, inefficient, and at odds with economic
copyright rationales. See infra notes 276–78 and accompanying text. Such solutions ranged from
limiting statutory damages to abolishing copyright protection for orphan works altogether. See id.
Others have suggested drawing solutions from patent law, such as requiring owners to search for users.
See Katz, supra note 25; see also Tun-Jen Chiang, The Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1
(2013) (advocating same solution for patent law); Tun-Jen Chiang, The Common Cause of Trolls and
Orphans, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 30, 2012, 2:48 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2012/08/the-common-cause-of-trolls-and-orphans.html.
144
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3, at 93.
145
Id. at 96.
146
Id. at 94.
147
Id. at 8, 95.
148
In proposing the legislation, the Report noted that “[t]he Copyright Office does not currently
have any regulatory authority to address the orphan works issue in any meaningful way,” and so left the
proposed legislation open to suggestions from the stakeholders and the Judiciary Committee. Id. at 93.
149
Id. at 95–96.
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subsequent attribution;150 and second, a limitation on remedies sought
against a user who has performed such a reasonably diligent search.151
a. Reasonably diligent search and attribution.—“Almost every
commenter” pushing for a limitation-on-remedies approach agreed that a
search should be a “fundamental requirement” of fixing the orphan works
problem.152 The first prong of the search requirement is the search itself.
The Report recommended a reasonably diligent search conducted with
good faith and diligence.153
The Report did not require any formal guidelines for what would
constitute a reasonably diligent search and ultimately recommended an ad
hoc, case-by-case approach. This broad standard would account for the
tremendous variety of works and their potential uses within the wide range
of industries covered by copyright154 and would present two significant
benefits. First, it would account for new search technologies, which will
inevitably change the determination of whether a search is reasonable.155
Second, it would encourage voluntary development of industry-specific
guidelines for various types of searches.156
The Report also considered creating registries or databases, whether
mandatory or voluntary, to catalog prospective uses and users’ searches.157
It ultimately decided not to recommend enacting provisions for any type of
registry; instead, it deferred to the marketplace to create private
databases.158
The second prong of the search requirement is attribution: the user
must provide attribution to the owner when using the new work.159 As a
form of notice, attribution might encourage market transactions by
connecting the user and owner.160 It could also “curb abuse” by would-be
infringers, by reminding the user that she does not own the work.161

150

Id. at 8.
Id.
152
Id. at 5–6.
153
Id. at 98.
154
Id. at 6, 9, 98.
155
Id. at 98, 104. The Report listed six factors that could ultimately be used by a court to determine
the reasonableness of a search: (1) information displayed on the work itself; (2) whether the work was
published or unpublished; (3) the age of the work; (4) the availability of public records about the work;
(5) whether the author is still alive, the corporate owner still exists, and whether a record of any
copyright transfers exists; and (6) the nature, extent, and prominence of the proposed use, including
whether it is commercial or noncommercial. See id. at 9–10, 99–107.
156
Id. at 10.
157
Id. at 70, 73–77.
158
Id. at 95.
159
Id. at 8, 10.
160
Id. at 111.
161
Id. at 111–12.
151
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Because attribution is a type of moral right, and because the U.S.
policy is not premised on the recognition of moral rights, the attribution
requirement is a step in the right direction by the U.S. to harmonize its
policies with countries that follow an author’s rights regime.162 Of the four
sticks in the bundle of moral rights, attribution is the most friendly to a
utilitarian regime.163 Attribution is simply about recognition: even those
authors and creators who are currently willing to permit wide dissemination
and reuse of their works on a royalty-free basis—through a system like the
Creative Commons licenses—still request attribution in such licenses.164
b. Limitation on remedies.—Once a user can prove that she has
carried out a reasonably diligent search, the limitation on remedies would
become available to her should an owner resurface.165 The Report
recommended a two-pronged approach to limiting remedies: first, limiting
monetary relief for all uses, and second, limiting injunctive relief for
derivative uses, both of which are subject to a residual provision protecting
the user.
First, the recommended legislation would limit monetary relief to
“reasonable compensation,” which primarily protects direct uses.166 This
would limit awards of statutory damages and attorney’s fees, which would
be beneficial “because those remedies create the most uncertainty in the
minds of users.”167 Limiting monetary relief would thereby remove the
financial deterrent effect of orphan works.168
Second, injunctive relief would not be available where the orphan
work was incorporated into a derivative work with “substantial expression
[added by] the user,”169 but it may be available in all other cases, provided
that the court “account for and accommodate” the user’s reliance interest.170
In keeping with the economic rationale, a user’s derivative work would be
afforded greater protection because she has “contributed new expression to
the public benefit.”171 Protecting derivative works would primarily be
beneficial for filmmakers and book publishers, who would otherwise risk a

162

See id. at 89, 110–12.
The four sticks include the rights of attribution (or paternity), integrity, divulgation, and
withdrawal. See supra note 43.
164
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3, at 111.
165
Id. at 8.
166
Id. at 115.
167
Id. at 7, 115.
168
Id. at 115.
169
While injunctive relief would not be available for derivative works with substantial user-added
expression, the user must provide “reasonable compensation” to the original owner. See id. at 120.
170
Id.
171
Id.
163
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potential injunction if an owner were to resurface just as a film is released
or a book is going to press.172
This would also reduce the injunctive risk for modern visual and
performance artists who use expressive forms that inherently incorporate
existing works, like collage, found-object art, and sampling. Some creators,
like the mash-up and digital sampling artist Girl Talk,173 may continue to
create and perform their works under the fair use defense,174 but others may
not be so “brave (or reckless).”175 An elimination of injunctions for
derivative works would protect the more risk-averse artists.
Lastly, the proposed residual provision is most indicative of the
utilitarian approach to protect the user and subsequent public access. It
stipulates that any condition that does not fall explicitly under the
injunctive relief provision should protect the user’s reliance interest.176
Once the user has undertaken a reasonably diligent search, the court should
balance the interests of the owner and the user.
c. Miscellaneous and missing provisions.—The Report also
recommended that legislation include a savings clause177 and an automatic
ten-year sunset provision.178 This would force Congress to revisit and
reexamine the utility of the legislation.179
Notably, the Report did not propose any licensing or fee-payment
system. Some commenters proposed instituting a system of licensing
orphan works at fees subject to variable or reasonable rates, or at low
statutory fees to be paid into an escrow account.180 As discussed below in
Part III.B, the U.K. supports such a system and has recently enacted
provisions for its implementation.181 The U.S. Copyright Office, however,
172

Id. at 119–20.
GIRL TALK, http://illegal-art.net/girltalk/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2014) (Gregg Gillis, performing
under name Girl Talk).
174
Robert Levine, Steal This Hook? D.J. Skirts Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2008, at E1
(“Because his samples are short, and his music sounds so little like the songs he takes from that it is
unlikely to affect their sales, Mr. Gillis contends he should be covered under fair use.”).
175
Laura N. Bradrick, Note, Copyright—Don’t Forget About the Orphans: A Look at a (Better)
Legislative Solution to the Orphan Works Problem, 34 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 537, 553 (2012).
176
See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3, at 115. Injunctive relief would be limited for
derivative works that incorporate the orphaned work. Outside of a derivative work situation, then, the
court would be instructed to prioritize the interests of the user. See id.
177
Id. at 121 (“[The Savings Clause would] make[] clear that nothing in the new section on orphan
works affects rights and limitations to copyright elsewhere in the Copyright Act, which is consistent
with the structural approach on placing the provision in the remedies chapter.”).
178
Id. (providing that “the provision sunset after ten years, which will allow Congress to examine
whether and how the orphan works provision is working in practice, and whether any changes are
needed”).
179
See id.
180
Id. at 7.
181
See infra notes 234–48 and accompanying text.
173
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declined to recommend an escrow-based licensing system in its 2006
Report because it claimed that such a system would violate the efficiency
goal of its proposed legislation.182 Instead, the Report recommended further
congressional study to establish a small claims court or other system of
dispute resolution to consider orphan works licensing issues.183 As
discussed below, this failure to include a licensing system may have
contributed to the recommendation’s demise.
2. Failed Bills.—After examining the Report, Congress proposed
two bills in 2008184 to incorporate the recommendations. The proposed
Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008185 came the closest to
implementing orphan works legislation. The Bill proposed a limitation on
remedies, split into the two prongs of (1) a reasonably diligent search
requirement and (2) a limit on remedies available to a resurfacing owner.186
Congress nearly passed the Bill shortly before the 2008 election, but did
not adopt the measure before adjourning at the end of the term.187 The
reasons for the Bill’s failure are not entirely clear. Some point to the broad
vagueness of the diligent search requirements and the negative reaction
from stakeholder industries.188
Photographers and independent musicians were the most vocal
stakeholders opposed to the Bill, and they remain so today.189
Photographers may have the most to lose if a photo is deemed to be
orphaned; because a photo typically focuses on a third party or an
inanimate object or landscape instead of the photographer herself, the work
lacks any inherent identification information.190 Moreover, with the
dominance of digital technology, any information incorporated into a
digital photo’s metadata can be stripped from the photo with relative ease,
allowing the photo to be passed off as an orphan.191
Similarly, independent musicians typically do not have the financial or
technological resources of a large music label, and so fear that their works
might be used for profit without their consent, whether standing alone or
182

REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 3, at 11, 113–14.
Id. at 11, 114.
184
Notice of Inquiry, 77 Fed. Reg. 64,555, 64,556 (Oct. 22, 2012).
185
S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008).
186
Id.; Notice of Inquiry, 77 Fed. Reg. at 64,556.
187
Notice of Inquiry, 77 Fed. Reg. at 64,556.
188
See Bradrick, supra note 175, at 559, 565.
189
See, e.g., RICH BENGLOFF, AM. ASS’N OF INDEP. MUSIC, IN THE MATTER OF ORPHAN WORKS
AND MASS DIGITIZATION (2012), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/noi_
10222012/American-Association-Independent-Music-A2IM.pdf; AM. PHOTOGRAPHIC ARTISTS ET AL.,
PROPOSAL FOR ORPHAN WORKS LEGISLATION (2013), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/
comments/noi_10222012/American-Photographic-Artists-APA.pdf.
190
Compare this to a sound recording by a popular artist whose voice is recognizable and thus less
susceptible to a false orphan status.
191
See AM. PHOTOGRAPHIC ARTISTS ET AL., supra note 189.
183
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incorporated in derivative works.192 These stakeholders fear that any
legislation condoning uses of orphan works would create a loophole for
users to misappropriate photos and sound recordings without the artist’s
consent, simply by claiming that the freelance photographer or the
independent musician could not be located.
3. The 2012 Notice.—Though the Report and legislation ultimately
failed, they laid the groundwork for the American stance on orphan works.
In light of increased international discussion, it is time to try again. On
October 22, 2012, the Copyright Office renewed its efforts to solve the
orphan works issue by issuing a Notice of Inquiry.193 The Notice asked
scholars and interested parties to comment on two issues: first, what might
have changed since the 2008 Bill and the 2006 Report, and second, how
orphan works fare within the mass digitization context.194 The Notice
suggested discussion of the following topics:
The merits of limiting remedies; the interplay between orphan works and fair
use, section 108, section 121, or other exceptions and limitations; the role of
licensing; the types of orphan works that should be implicated; the types of
users who should benefit; the practical or legal hurdles to forming or utilizing
registries; international implications; and the relative importance of the
Register’s plans to improve the quality and searchability of Copyright Office
records.195

The Notice also acknowledged the myriad international actions on the
orphan works front, even acknowledging the European Union’s October
2012 Directive in the Notice’s first paragraph.196 This recognition of foreign
progress emphasizes the U.S.’s desire to contribute to and comply with the
international copyright system.
The U.S. Copyright Office received ninety-one initial comments and
eighty-nine reply comments in response to the Notice.197 Taking these

192

See BENGLOFF, supra note 189.
Notice of Inquiry, 77 Fed. Reg. 64,555 (Oct. 22, 2012).
194
See id. at 64,560–61.
195
Id. at 64,560.
196
See id. at 64,555.
197
See Comments on Orphan Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/
comments/noi_10222012/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2014); Comments on Orphan Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/noi_11302012/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). Many
of the reply comments synthesized the opinions that emerged from the initial comments, largely
endorsing the 2006 Report’s proposals and recommending the incorporation of fair use into any new
proposal. See, e.g., JUNE M. BESEK & JANE C. GINSBURG, KERNOCHAN CENTER FOR LAW, MEDIA &
THE ARTS, REPLY COMMENTS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO NOTICE OF INQUIRY ON ORPHAN WORKS AND
MASS DIGITIZATION (March 6, 2013), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/noi_
11302012/Columbia-Law-School-Kernochan-Center.pdf; DAVID HANSEN ET AL., BERKELEY DIGITAL
LIBRARY COPYRIGHT PROJECT, REPLY COMMENTS TO ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION
NOTICE OF INQUIRY, 77 FED. REG. 64,555 (OCT. 22, 2012) (March 6, 2013), available at
193
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comments into account, this Note will evaluate international actions to
synthesize and recommend the best approach for a U.S. orphan works
solution to be consistent with international harmonization.
B. U.K. Efforts
Uncertainty surrounding orphan works is equally detrimental to the
United Kingdom’s copyright policy. In a modern economy, protection of
such intellectual property grows more imperative as the U.K. seeks to
maintain its status as a world economic power.198 Accordingly, it undertook
a similar process of issuing reports and recommendations, resulting in new
legislation. The recently enacted licensing system, discussed below,199 is a
first step to ensuring that British creators are afforded their economic rights
as owners within the creative industries.200
1. Past U.K. Efforts.—Before the recent legislation, some provisions
of the U.K. copyright code201 addressed the orphan works issue, but as with
existing U.S. copyright law, these provisions were narrow in scope and
ultimately insufficient. The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act creates an
exception that a copyright cannot be infringed for works whose copyright
can reasonably be assumed to have expired, and for works whose owner
cannot be ascertained “by reasonable inquiry.”202 While this is insufficient
for a user to have confidence that her liability risk has been eliminated, the
provision at least reduces concerns related to the copyright’s duration.203
In 2006, the U.K.’s Chancellor of the Exchequer commissioned a
report on whether the U.K.’s intellectual property system was well
positioned in an era of globalization and technology, which included an

http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/noi_11302012/Berkeley-Digital-Library-CopyrightProject.pdf.
198
See Press Release, Intellectual Prop. Office, Modernising Copyright to Help Strengthen
Contribution to Growth (July 2, 2012), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/about/press/press-release/
press-release-2012/press-release-20120702.htm (“Harnessing the value and making the most of the
UK’s intellectual property is a vital element of a vibrant and modern economy. The measures outlined
today will form an important part of the Government’s growth strategy, making sure the UK is one of
the best places to start, finance and grow a business.”).
199
See infra notes 244–46 and accompanying text.
200
See Press Release, Intellectual Prop. Office, supra note 198 (U.K. Business Minister Norman
Lamb noted: “It is vital that we make the most of our creative industries, boosting their contribution to
the economy while ensuring protection of the rights holders. The copyright licensing system has been
behind the times and we need to modernise and make it fit for the 21st century.”).
201
Note that the U.K. orphan works situation is somewhat complicated because the government
may in fact be the largest holder of orphan works: under the Companies Act, “all copyright last owned
by a dissolved company under the Companies Act pass to the Crown.” Khong, supra note 11, at 561.
Nevertheless, the U.K.’s current and proposed orphan works measures make government-owned works
exempt from these provisions.
202
c. 48, § 57(1) (U.K.).
203
See Notice of Inquiry, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739, 3741 (Jan. 26, 2005).
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analysis of the orphan works situation.204 The resulting Gowers Report
offered three recommendations regarding orphan works. First and
primarily, it called for the U.K. to develop a proposed solution to the
orphan works situation, and it suggested waiting for the European
Commission to issue a Directive before taking any action of its own.205
Second, it suggested defining parameters for a “reasonable search” for the
copyright owner.206 Third, it proposed establishing a voluntary register of
copyrighted works.207
Separately, the U.K. Intellectual Property Office (IPO)208 consulted the
British Copyright Council, a trade group representing stakeholders, about
the Gowers Report.209 The IPO’s response to the Gowers Report was
“uncharacteristically terse,”210 and the IPO stated its intention to legislate
nationally rather than forward the proposal to the European Commission.211
Furthermore, it stated that the parameters of a diligent search would be
considered only after the passage of relevant legislation, and that the
copyright industries were in the process of developing databases and
licensing schemes of their own.212
In 2009, Parliament proposed the Digital Economy Bill, which
included a proposal for licensing orphan works.213 After a rushed period of
debate before an imminent dissolution of the Parliament, the orphan works
provisions were eliminated from the final draft of the Bill and not included
in the resulting Digital Economy Act.214 Some suspect that the licensing
proposal was doomed from the start and that the Bill was deliberately
delayed so that the provisions could be thrown out during this “wash-up”

204

See GOWERS, supra note 11, at 1, 3–4. The Report was named after its committee chairman,
Andrew Gowers, former editor of the Financial Times. See Khong, supra note 11.
205
See GOWERS, supra note 11, at 6, 71.
206
Id. at 71–72.
207
See id. at 72.
208
The IPO is an Executive Agency of the U.K.’s Department for Business Innovation and Skills,
see Our Mission, INTELL. PROP. OFF., http://www.ipo.gov.uk/about/whatwedo.htm (last visited Jan. 7,
2014), which is one of twenty-four Ministerial Departments in the U.K. See Departments, Agencies &
Public Bodies, GOV’T UNITED KINGDOM, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations (last visited
Jan. 7, 2014). The Chancellor of the Exchequer is the head of the HM Treasury, another Ministerial
Department, and thus these reactions reflect the policies of different departments. See Ministerial Role,
GOV’T UNITED KINGDOM, https://www.gov.uk/government/ministers/chancellor-of-the-exchequer (last
visited Jan. 7, 2014).
209
Khong, supra note 11.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Digital Economy Bill, 2009-10, H.L. Bill [1] cl. 42 (U.K.) (enacted without the orphan works
section); see Khong, supra note 11, at 563.
214
See Khong, supra note 11, at 563. Compare Digital Economy Bill, 2009-10, H.L. Bill [1] cl. 42
(U.K.), with Digital Economy Act, 2010, c. 24 (U.K.).
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period.215 Indeed, although the Parliamentary record does not reflect any
debate over these orphan works provisions, the record does indicate that
parts of the Bill were “highly contentious” and were deliberately left out
during the wash-up period.216
More importantly for future legislation, however, the proposal was not
complete by any means and lacked several necessary stipulations. For
example, the term “orphan works” was never defined. Additionally, the
Bill’s “broad and sweeping measures” faced opposition from many other
stakeholder groups, including professional photographers.217 A group of
professional photographers created a website to argue that the Bill’s orphan
works clause would “take away their livelihood from negotiated licensing
fees . . . as users could easily claim that the copyright owners are not
identifiable or located.”218
Despite its failure to pass, the proposal reflected the British legislative
approach to an orphan works solution, at least as of 2010. The licensing
provision would have empowered the Secretary of State to make
regulations to create two new licensing schemes: one for individual orphan
works, and one for extended collective licensing.219 Further, the Secretary
would have been allowed to regulate on an industry-specific basis.220
Lastly, the Secretary would have been granted the power to create and
oversee a relevant licensing body “to adopt a code of practice” to deal with
various matters arising under the schemes, including handling royalty
accounts and reporting back to the Secretary.221 This basic framework set
the stage for the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act two years later.
2. European Union Directive on Orphan Works.—While U.K.
attempts had stalled, the European Union passed a Directive222 on October

215

See Khong, supra note 11, at 565.
6 Apr. 2010, PARL. DEB., H.C. (2010) 829 (U.K.) (“The wash-up following the decision to
dissolve Parliament is, by tradition and convention, always uncontentious and by agreement. Significant
parts of the Digital Economy Bill are highly contentious and it is the view of many that it should not be
debated at all following the announcement of Dissolution and that it could and should properly be left to
a future Government, which could be done very swiftly indeed.”).
217
Khong, supra note 11, at 564.
218
Id. at 562.
219
Digital Economy Bill, 2009-10, H.L. Bill [1] cl. 42 (U.K.). An individual licensing scheme
would grant licenses for a single work, such as a poem used as text for a choral work. An extended
licensing scheme would grant licenses for multiple works, which would be necessary for a library’s
efforts to digitize a large collection of works. See Khong, supra note 11, at 562–63.
220
See Digital Economy Bill, 2009-10, H.L. Bill [1] cl. 42 (U.K.).
221
Id. at sch. 2; see also Khong, supra note 11, at 563.
222
EU Directives set out policies that must be implemented in each EU Member State. Each state
may decide for itself how to adapt its laws accordingly. See What are EU Directives?, EUR.
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/introduction/what_directive_en.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
216
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25, 2012, entitled “On Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works.”223 The
Directive imposes a two-year deadline by which all Member States,
including the U.K., must pass national orphan works legislation to
implement the Directive.224 The EU was motivated to enact the Directive
because of the impending threat from the Google Books litigation; its
Parliament sought to prevent a “knowledge gap” between the U.S. and the
EU in the event that the Google Books Settlement was approved.225
The Directive establishes “an exception or limitation to the right of
reproduction” for certain uses of orphan works226 by organizations with
“public-interest missions” within the Member States.227 While the Directive
grants such limited use only to public institutional users,228 it encourages
these users to engage in “public–private partnership agreements.”229 Despite
its critics,230 the Directive allows each Member State to carry out the
Directive’s aims while tailoring its goal to the Member State’s own needs.
Moreover, it explicitly exempts stand-alone photography from the subject
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Directive 2012/28/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on
Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, 2012 O.J. (L 299) 5. The Directive is part of a program to
create a “Digital Single Market,” which is part of a multistep, overarching “Digital Agenda for Europe”
undertaken by the EU. See id.; Digital Agenda for Europe, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/
digital-agenda/en/our-goals/pillar-i-digital-single-market (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). The very first two
action steps delineated in the Agenda concern orphan works: Action 1 calls for “[s]implifying panEuropean licensing for online works,” and Action 2 calls for “[p]reserving orphan works and out of
print works.” See Digital Agenda for Europe, supra.
224
Directive 2012/28/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on
Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, art. 9, 2012 O.J. (L 299) 5, 10.
225
Notice of Inquiry, 77 Fed. Reg. 64,555, 64,559 (October 22, 2012). See de la Durantaye, supra
note 6, for a full discussion of the European Union’s response to the Google Books Project and its
ensuing litigation, and the impact it has had on European attempts to enact legislation to solve the
orphan works problem and embark on a mass digitization process.
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Directive 2012/28/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on
Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, art. 6, 2012 O.J. (L 299) 5, 9.
227
Id. art. 1, 8.
228
Public institutional users include “publicly accessible libraries, educational establishments and
museums, . . . archives, film or audio heritage institutions and public-service broadcasting
organisations.” Id.
229
See id. para. 21.
230
The EU Directive has been criticized for being too broad, too expensive, and too permissive in
“open[ing] the door to the commodification of orphan works.” EU Orphan Works Draft Disappointing,
Some Lawmakers, Consumer Activists Say, WASH. INTERNET DAILY (Sept. 14, 2012) (LEXIS). These
critics, however, overlook the manner in which the Directive will be implemented. Because each
Member State is required to pass its own national law to comply with the Directive, the State can tailor
the Directive’s goals to its own needs, thus narrowing the scope of the Directive’s aims. For example,
the U.K.’s Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act carries out the Directive’s aims while tailoring to its
own needs: it narrows the scope by permitting industry-specific regulations, Enterprise and Regulatory
Reform Act, 2013, c. 24, § 77(3) (U.K.) (amending The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988)
(inserting § 116D(1)(c)), and it compromises with author’s rights principles by making allowances for a
resurfacing owner, id. (inserting § 116C(5)–(6)(a)).
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matter of the Directive and calls for additional review on this subject,231
thereby addressing one of the main concerns of licensing’s critics. For
other users to qualify under the exception, they must undertake a diligent
search and register their works in a single European orphan registry, the
creation of which is also mandated by the Directive.232
3. Successful Legislation in the U.K.—On April 25, 2013, the U.K.
Parliament implemented the EU Directive by passing orphan works
legislation as part of its omnibus Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act
2013.233 Introduced in July 2012234 just before the adoption of the EU
Directive, the Act is the most recent example of the U.K.’s continued
commitment to harmonization of international copyright principles.
The Act grants powers to the Secretary of State to dispatch an orphan
works solution.235 Primarily, the proposed provision creates a licensing
scheme for commercial and noncommercial uses of orphan works, which
includes both individual and voluntary extended collective licensing on a
nonexclusive basis.236 The Act allows the Secretary of State to appoint a
regulatory body to grant licenses to works that are deemed to be
orphaned.237
The Act requires a diligent search, but notably, it does not define what
criteria should be used to determine the appropriateness of such a search.238
Rather, it defers to the regulatory body that was created by the Act to
promulgate specific search regulations.239 While the diligent search
language echoes the U.S. proposal, the U.K. Act goes much further by
allowing for industry-specific regulations.240
Furthermore, as a concession to author’s rights, the Act protects the
rights of owners by stipulating that the user of an orphan work will not be

231

Directive 2012/28/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on
Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, art. 10, 2012 O.J. (L 299) 5, 10.
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(October 22, 2012).
233
c. 24, § 77(3) (U.K.) (amending The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988).
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granted exclusive rights over the work.241 Additionally, an owner can
always “limit or exclude the grant of licen[s]es,”242 and a resurfacing owner
maintains the right to revoke the license after it has been granted to a
supposedly orphaned work.243
Lastly, the Act stipulates that the regulations must provide for the
collection of royalties reaped from the licenses.244 The royalty provisions
must specify how to allocate administrative costs, how long to hold
royalties, and how to treat the royalties after the designated period has
ended.245 The U.K. Impact Assessment suggested that such royalties be kept
in an escrow-type account for five or six years, after which time they would
be returned to the Crown, to be used as the Crown sees fit, though with a
suggestion that the proceeds be reinvested in maintaining the copyright
registries.246 This royalty provision would be an excellent model for the
suggested, but not implemented, U.S. fee system because it collects fees
that can be given to an owner who resurfaces within a specified statute of
limitations. Moreover, if the owner does not resurface, the collected fees
are used to help find owners of other works by maintaining registries and
databases.
The Act is not without its opponents. Some stakeholders had predicted
a firestorm of international litigation if the Bill were to pass, claiming that
“[t]he prospect of unknown, ongoing unlicensed usage of foreign works in
the U.K. will prevent any rights holder in any country from licensing
exclusive rights to any party.”247 Indeed, some of the most vocal opponents
are actually American artists who fear loss of rights abroad;248 this provides
all the more reason for the U.S. to follow the U.K.’s lead once again and
pass orphan works legislation of its own.
241
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IV. SYNTHESIZING AN IDEAL ORPHAN WORKS SOLUTION
Looking forward, the U.S. must continue down the path of
international harmonization by resolving the orphan works issue, as
advocated by Justice Breyer,249 to further the two principles initially stated
in the Berne Convention Implementation Act. First, the U.S. should help
shape global copyright policy,250 especially with respect to mass
digitization. Second, the U.S. must ensure that its authors are protected, as
it has now completed the shift from major importer to major exporter amid
a growing piracy threat.
These policy goals are complicated, however, when confronted with
the orphan works problem. Indeed, there is a certain irony in that
abolishing formalities to comply with international harmonization greatly
contributed to, if not directly created, the very problem of orphan works,
which can now be solved by looking to international norms. However,
because the U.K. eliminated formalities and extended its copyright’s
duration well before the U.S. took the same steps that would exacerbate the
orphan works problem,251 its Parliament has greater familiarity with this
issue.252 Thus, the U.K.’s extensive experience can suitably guide U.S.
legislation. Moreover, the shared economic copyright rationale gives the
U.K. and the U.S. a common platform from which to embark on continued
international harmonization.
Despite the Google fair use holding, the exemption of orphan works
from the Project and HathiTrust confirm that court remedies alone are
insufficient to provide an internationally harmonized orphan works solution
that gives certainty to all prospective users. Moreover, private market
solutions look increasingly less viable as they would present obstacles to
Berne compliance.253 Accordingly, the U.S. orphan works issue must now
be addressed along the only avenue remaining: through Congress.
This Part will suggest that the U.S. should adopt the U.K.’s licensing
scheme, and that the U.K. could, in turn, benefit from incorporating parts of
the U.S.’s limitation on remedies approach.
249
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A. Applying the U.K. Approach to the U.S.
The U.S.’s limitation on remedies approach is ultimately insufficient
as a sole solution to the orphan works issue. Under such a regime, while an
owner need not register his work in order to receive copyright protection,254
an owner must register his work in order to bring a copyright infringement
claim.255 A work that is deemed an orphan after a diligent search is not
likely to be subject to an infringement claim: if the work had been
registered with the U.S. Copyright Office, the user would likely be able to
identify the owner through the Copyright Office’s records, and the work
would not be designated as an orphan.256 Thus, a limitation on remedies
alone is insufficient.257 Additionally, this highlights the need for the
creation of comprehensive databases, as acknowledged by Congress.258
The U.S. and U.K. approaches are similar in their basic search
requirements and their treatment of derivative works. Both countries agree
that requiring the user to conduct a diligent search for the copyright owner
is a fundamental threshold requirement. The U.K. Act, however, takes a
more tailored approach by calling for industry-specific search
regulations.259 Though the U.S. raised this as a possibility,260 it could greatly
benefit from making it a legislative reality. By acknowledging that various
industries have different needs, such regulations would be consistent with
the economic principle of protecting the interests of the user and the public.
Furthermore, both countries agree that derivative works should be
afforded additional protection in return for their additional creative
contribution to the public. The U.S. proposal allows creators of derivative
works that incorporate an orphan work and add “substantial expression of
the user” to avoid injunctive relief and makes them subject only to
reasonable monetary damages.261 The U.K. implicitly suggested a
protection for creators of derivative works by requiring the regulations to
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provide for the rights of a user if a resurfacing owner should revoke the
license.262
On the other hand, the approaches differ drastically with respect to
licensing and mass digitization. First, their primary difference is that the
U.K.’s Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act establishes a licensing
scheme. The U.S. could greatly benefit from instituting both an individual
licensing system and an extended licensing system of its own, because such
systems would provide security, confidence, and legal certainty for each
user.263 Different types of users have different needs and risk tolerances;264
by providing a multifaceted strategy, the U.S. would ensure that both its
individual users and its institutional users need not face the risk of an
infringement lawsuit from a resurfacing owner, which can be accomplished
by providing individual and extended licenses.
An orphan works license would be particularly useful to alleviate an
intermediate user’s risk of secondary liability. For example, a photo reprint
service might be wary of copying an orphaned photograph if the user is
unable to show that she has the right to use the work. The U.S.’s limitation
on remedies approach inherently requires a risk assessment, and such riskaverse intermediaries would likely feel more secure in their legal certainty
and reduced risk with a licensing structure in place.265 Indeed, the U.S.
Copyright Office has recognized, though not acted upon, the potential
usefulness of licenses, especially in the context of mass digitization.266 In
lieu of a licensing solution to this problem, however, the Register
encouraged a market solution calling for photography associations to come
up with guidelines governing such secondary liability issues.267 While a
market solution may have been initially helpful, a legislative licensing
solution like the U.K.’s will provide more long-term certainty.
The licensing option necessarily creates a concern of whether and how
to create a fee structure for royalties, and to whom the royalty proceeds
should be distributed if the owner does not resurface. The suggested U.K.
scheme holds the royalties in an escrow account for a period of time, after
which time the proceeds are given to the Crown for general use, albeit with
a strong suggestion that the royalty proceeds be used to maintain the
registries.268 Similarly, the EU Directive includes provisions to require “fair
262
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compensation” for uses of each orphan work to be held for a resurfacing
owner,269 and to allow public institutions to “generate revenues” from their
efforts and reinvest them in their digitization projects, which may include
database maintenance.270 While this scheme would help alleviate any
funding problems in the creation of such databases, adopting a similar
system in the U.S. could implicate a number of issues,271 including a
resurfacing owner’s argument that the government unconstitutionally took
the license fees, and therefore his property, without his consent. The U.S.
should ultimately adopt a similar royalty structure, but would first need to
consider and overcome such concerns.
Second, the U.S. legislation is perhaps most noteworthy for its lack of
any specific provisions for, or even discussion of, digitization.
Notwithstanding the 2012 Notice of Inquiry’s call for comments on mass
digitization,272 the U.S. has already fallen behind the EU and the U.K. by
not providing for the digitization of its cultural materials.273 This could be
for any number of reasons: the U.S. legislation may have been abandoned
before the need for digitization became apparent, or there may have been a
lack of technological understanding by lawmakers. This will slowly
change, however, as Congress delegates information gathering to the U.S.
Copyright Office, which in turn solicits commentary from tech-savvy
stakeholders.
A lack of existing U.S. solutions could also reflect an underlying U.S.
preference to leave digitization to private enterprises, like the Google
Books Project. Perhaps the Copyright Office was waiting to see whether
such private initiatives would provide a viable solution.274 Abandoning the
mass digitization initiative to the private market entirely, however, would
surely create a harmonization problem in which the eventual U.S. private
system would conflict with the recently enacted EU public system. The two
systems could be reconciled, however, by relying to some extent on public–
private partnerships to create databases and registries.
Opponents of any U.S. orphan works legislation that would create a
licensing system have valid concerns275: some claim that a limitation on
remedies is sufficient and that a licensing system would unduly harm
owners.276 Others claim that fair use is the only necessary protection for
269
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nonprofit institutions as they embark on digitization, and thus no legislation
of any kind is needed.277 Yet these arguments are limited in scope. They
consider only the needs of institutional users, and do nothing to help the
risk-averse individual user.
Moreover, they overlook that the creation of a registry and a diligent
search requirement would aid stakeholders more than it would harm them.
First, the individuals and organizations who expressed concerns about such
legislation are necessarily aware of the potential loophole in the legislation.
This awareness will serve them well: they will be diligent in enforcing their
rights as owners, showing that these are not the owners of orphans that the
legislation is intended to protect. Second, stakeholders like photographers
and independent musicians are admittedly adept at facilitating the
dissemination of their work on the Internet,278 and so are in the best position
to make their ownership known through registries. Finally, the variation in
concerns among different stakeholder groups further supports a broad
diligent search standard, with more specific search requirements regulated
by each industry, as suggested above.
B. Applying the U.S. Approach to the U.K.
The U.S.’s limitation on remedies proposal could also be beneficial to
the U.K. and the EU in that it applies to all users, not just nonprofit
organizations like museums, archives, and libraries. The remedies approach
still preserves and provides “meaningful relief” to all authors and owners,279
whereas the EU approach only creates carve-outs for nonprofits to facilitate
their efforts in mass digitization.280
An individual amateur user, like the choral composer, would benefit
most from the U.S.’s limitation on remedies approach. Such users
“typically. . . [have] expertise or interest in a particular subject and wish[]
to make use of works, such as old journals, books or articles, that relate to
[an] area of interest.”281 Such users are arguably at the greatest risk in using
orphan works for three reasons. First, they may have less experience with
orphan works issues, whereas a library is likely to be well-versed in
potential orphan works legal entanglements. Second, enthusiasts are likely
to have less legal expertise in general and so may not even be aware of
such copyright concerns. Finally, if enthusiasts are indeed unlucky enough
to find themselves on the defensive end of a lawsuit, they may not have the
(advocating a judicially created limitation on remedies through use of existing equitable doctrines,
including fair use).
277
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financial resources to defend themselves, as a library or museum would.282
Thus, the U.S. approach would be enormously helpful in protecting the
interests of an individual enthusiast user.
However, even an enthusiast user would be expected to undertake a
diligent search before using the orphan work. The 2006 Report’s detailed
discussion of the requirements of a diligent search could lend support to the
U.K. regulatory body as it seeks to develop search requirements. While the
U.K.’s Gowers Report briefly acknowledged that searches would likely
vary by industry,283 the U.S.’s 2006 Report’s aggregation of comments led
to the proposed solution of a case-by-case search through voluntary
industry-specific databases.284 These detailed suggestions could prove
useful to the U.K. regulatory body when promulgating search
regulations.285
CONCLUSION
As enacted by the U.K., a licensing system makes the most sense for
an economically based regime because it balances the interests of the user,
and by extension the public at large, with the interests of the owner. It
provides an industry-specific approach, gives legal certainty to the user,
and compensates owners who resurface within the statute of limitations.
As proposed by the U.S., a limitation on remedies system suitably
restricts the rights of a resurfacing owner, but does nothing to explicitly
permit the user to incorporate an orphan work. Such users still face the
legal uncertainty that existed before any such limitation. There may be
some merit in limiting remedies for the individual user, as advocated by
some stakeholders. This should only be done within the context of a
licensing system, however, and should be considered a last resort. The
individual user, no matter how small the project or the institution, should
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still undertake the diligent search and licensing process to reach the proper
balance of interests between owner and user.
The international copyright regime still has a long way to go in
providing for effective and seamless use of orphan works. To spur the
discussion, the U.S. must reclaim its position as a leader in international
harmonization of copyright by proposing and passing orphan works
legislation. To do so, Congress and the U.S. Copyright Office should look
to the U.K., the U.S.’s sister in economically based copyright, to guide its
establishment of a licensing system for both nonprofit and commercial use
of orphan works.
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